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PROPERTY LAW
I. COURT FINDS ABUSE OF PROCESS IN FILING OF SUIT FOR
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND Lis PENDENS
In Broadmoor Apartments v. Horwitz' the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that the trial court properly submitted the issue of abuse of
process to the jury.2 The trial court denied the defendants' motion for
a directed verdict because there was sufficient evidence that all of the
defendants had participated or aided in the abuse of process.3
Defendant, Max Schlopy, offered to purchase an apartment complex
from Broadmoor Apartments of Charleston ("Broadmoor"). The sales
contract required a $75,000 deposit, which the Broadmoor principals
later reduced to $50,000 at Schlopy's request. Schlopy never made the
deposit, so Broadmoor notified Schlopy that it had rejected his offer.
Broadmoor refused Schlopy's request for an additional reduction of the
deposit.4 Nevertheless, Schlopy attempted to assign the contract to
Berkeley Square Associates, Inc. ("Berkeley"). 5 Broadmoor refused to
consent to the assignment, which included provisions stating that the
contract was valid and that the agreed-upon deposit was $25,000.
Horwitz, Berkeley's president, then issued a $50,000 draft to cover the
deposit, but the account on which he made the draft had a balance of
only $10. Subsequently, Horwitz sued Broadmoor for specific perform-
ance of the contract and filed a notice of lis pendens against the property.
The court found that there was no enforceable contract. Broadmoor then
sued Berkeley, Horwitz, and Schlopy for slander of title and abuse of
process. 6 The trial court dismissed the slander of title action by directed
verdict, but the jury returned a $750,000 verdict for the Broadmoor on
the abuse of process claim.7
The Broadmoor court noted that the defendants' actions satisfied the
elements required for an abuse of process action: "(1) an ulterior
purpose, and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the
1. 413 S.E.2d 9 (S.C. 1991).
2. Id. at 12.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 10.
5. Id. at 10 & n.1.
6. Id. at 10-11.
7. Id. at 11.
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regular conduct of the proceedings." 8 The defendants' ulterior purpose
was to tie up the property while they obtained additional financing and
to force Broadmoor to contract with them on more favorable terms.9 The
defendants knew that there was no contract, that they had neither paid
nor possessed the funds to pay the security deposit, and that they never
had a loan commitment for the purchase. 10 Thus, a jury question existed
as to whether the defendants willfully used the process as a form of
extortion instead of as a method to protect a genuine claim on a valid
contract.II
Some lis pendens statutes have been invalidated as unconstitutional
takings because the statutes deprived property owners of the right of
alienation without due process."2 Ordinarily, an owner cannot sell or
mortgage property encumbered by a lis pendens because the lis pendens
makes title to the property uninsurable, thereby rendering the property
unmarketable. 3 While the action related to the lis pendens proceeds
through a crowded court system, a property ovaner may be deprived of
the right of alienation without a hearing for several years. 4 "[T]he
filing of a lis pendens can become a pernicious practice that has the same
8. Id. (citing Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 249 S.C. 206, 153 S.E.2d
693 (1967)); see also Sierra v. Skelton, 414 S.E.2d 169 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 cmt. b (1976). See generally W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 121, at 898 (5th
ed. 1984).
9. Broadmoor, 413 S.E.2d at 12.
10. See id.
11. Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-11-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976) ("In an action
affecting the title to real property the plaintiff ... may file ... a notice of the
pendency of the action.. . ."); Lebovitz v. Mudd, 293 S.C. 49, 358 S.E.2d 698
(1987) (holding that lis pendens was properly filed against property that was the
subject of a fraudulent conveyance action); Armstrong v. Carwile, 56 S.C. 463, 35
S.E. 196 (1900) (holding that lis pendens is authorized only when action affects real
estate); Hursey v. Hursey, 284 S.C. 323, 326 S.E.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that lis pendens is proper to protect property during pendency of divorce action). See
generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 898.
12. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105 (1991) (holding unconstitu-
tional a lis pendens statute authorizing an ex parte prejudgment attachment of real
estate without requiring prior notice, a pre-attachment hearing, or a showing of
exigent circumstances). See generally Valerie L. Castle, Note, After Malcom v.
Superior Court and Peery v. Superior Court.: A Due Process Analysis of California
Lis Pendens, 70 CAL. L. REV. 909, 919-28 (1982) (discussing California lis pendens
statute and due process).
13. SeeDoehr, 111 S. Ct. at2113; DeLeo v. Anthony A. Nunes, Inc., 546 A.2d
1344, 1347-48 (R.I. 1988), cert. dismissed and cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1074 (1989).
14. See generally Castle, supra note 12, at 911.
[Vol. 44
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [], Art. 17
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/17
PROPERTY LAW
effect as attaching one's property without the benefit of a court hear-
ing.
15
Because a lis pendens prevents alienation of property, it has the
potential for abuse. A party may fie a groundless suit using a lis pendens
as leverage to force a property owner to settle a claim that may be
unrelated to the property.' 6 However, filing a lis pendens without a
colorable claim "is done at the filer's peril";17 if the underlying suit is
without merit, the property owner can file an abuse of process suit to
recover any damages resulting from the owner's inability to convey the
property while encumbered by the lis pendens. s In Broadmoor, for
example, the lis pendens effectively tied up Broadmoor's property for
one and one-half years, although the suit brought by the defendants was
without merit.' 9 Broadmoor's $750,000 verdict is a warning for
plaintiffs to file a lis pendens only when they have a colorable claim to
the property, else face the risk of being liable to the owner for abuse of
process.W
An unsettling aspect of Broadmoor is the court's extension of
liability to those who "knowingly participate, aid, or abet in the abuse,"
as well as to joint tortfeasors who advise, consent or ratify the acts.2"
This liability generally does not extend to an attorney unless the attorney
willingly institutes a malicious action for her client;' however, the
exact line between legitimate advocacy and malicious prosecution is
unclear. In Gaar v. North Myrtle Beach Realty Co. 2 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that an attorney is immune from liability to third
15. DeLeo, 546 A.2d at 1347.
16. See Ruiz v. Varan, 797 P.2d 267 (N.M. 1990) (noting that defendant's action
for breach of contract to recover a real estate commission did not concern a claim of
title to the property; however, because defendant filed a lis pendens, property owner
was unable to sell thfe property, obtain title insurance, or use it as collateral for about
thirty-three months).
17. DeLeo, 546 A.2d at 1348.
18. Id. at 1347 (noting that defendant filed lis pendens not to protect a property
right, but to derail a land parcel's development).
19. Broadmoor Apartments v. Horwitz, 413 S.E.2d 9, 11 (S.C. 1991).
20. The verdict in Broadmoor was based upon a reduction in the value of the
property from the time Schlopy agreed to purchase it to the time of trial. Record at
620.
21. Broadmoor, 413 S.E.2d at 11-12.
22. See Gaar v. North Myrtle Beach Realty Co., 287 S.C. 525, 528-29, 339
S.E.2d 887, 889 (Ct. App. 1986); see also Hoppe v. Klapperich, 28 N.W.2d 780,
791 (Minn. 1947). See generally 1 AM. JuR. 2D Abuse of Process § 19 (1962).
23. 287 S.C. 525, 339 S.E.2d 889 (Ct. App. 1986).
1992]
3
Cauthen and DeMott: Property Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
persons if the attorney performs authorized activities in good faith.24
Judge Bell, writing for the court, noted that holding an attorney liable to
a third party for malicious prosecution when the attorney overzealously
advocates his client's position would inhibit free access to the courts.Y
Nevertheless, a plaintiff may bring a cause of action for abuse of process
against the attorney's client; the client may in turn sue her attorney for
malpractice if the attorney negligently filed an unwarranted claim.26
Furthermore, an attorney who knowingly and in bad faith files a
frivolous claim may be subject to discipline.27
The South Carolina Supreme Court recognizes an action for abuse
of process when a party willfully uses process for an ulterior purpose not
proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings. 28 A lis pendens is
especially susceptible to abuse because of its ability to prevent a
conveyance of property for a long period without a hearing. An attorney
who advises her client to file a lis pendens. should examine whether the
underlying claim is meritorious; otherwise, the attorney could face a
malpractice suit or perhaps disciplinary action.
M. Catherin Cauthen
II. DEVELOPER NOT ENTITLED TO VESTED RIGHTS IN ZONING
CLASSIFICATION
In DeStefano v. City of Charleston29 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that a developer does not acquire vested rights in a zoning
classification when a change in the zoning would cause no hardship for
the developer.3" In addition, the court held that a municipality is not
estopped from downzoning a developer's property after the developer
relied on statements of city officials who were acting beyond the scope
24. Id. at 528-29, 339 S.E.2d at 889.
25. Id. at 529, 339 S.E.2d at 889 (citing Cisson v. Pickens Say. & Loan Ass'n,
258 S.C. 37, 186 S.E.2d 822 (1972)).
26. Id. at 530, 339 S.E.2d at 890.
27. Id.; see also S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.1
& cmt. (stating that an action is frivolous if the client brings it "for the purpose of
harassing or maliciously injuring a person or if the lawyer is unable either to make
a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action by
a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law").
28. Broadmoor, 413 S.E.2d at 11.
29. 304 S.C. 250, 403 S.E.2d 648 (1991).
30. Id. at 255, 403 S.E.2d at 651.
'[Vol. 44
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [], Art. 17
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/17
PROPERTY LAW
of their governmental authority.3" The DeStefano court relied on
Friarsgate, Inc. v. Town of Irmo32 and adopted the majority rule for
determining when a landowner acquires vested rights in a zoning
classification.33
DeStefano, a developer, bought a tract of land on James Island. The
City of Charleston ("City") annexed the land34 and zoned the property
for multifamily residences. Thereafter, the City Engineering Department
approved the plans for DeStefano's proposed forty-lot subdivision, and
the City Planning and Zoning Commission ("Commission") approved the
plat for this development. DeStefano never recorded this plat because an
adjacent property owner disputed the boundary where DeStefano planned
to grant a drainage easement to the City. DeStefano subsequently
relinquished his claim to the disputed property, believing that the City
would not require a drainage easement from him if he no longer owned
the ditch. The Deputy City Engineer erroneously affirmed DeStefano's
belief.35
After DeStefano revised the previous plat by omitting the easement
and adding twelve new lots, he submitted this new plat for recording.
Unaware that the revised plat was different from the previously approved
one, the Zoning Administrator mistakenly told the Deputy City Engineer
that the Commission had approved the plat. The Deputy City Engineer,
ignorant of the added lots, stamped the plat for recording. DeStefano
recorded the revised plat and began to transfer lots from the new plat.
However, the City Staff subsequently noticed that the revised plat had
never been properly approved, so the Staff submitted the plat to the
Commission for the necessary approval.36
At the Commission's meeting to approve the revised plat, residents
living near the development expressed concern that the development
might aggravate drainage problems in the area. Because of these
concerns, the Commission postponed approval of the plat and refused to
issue any new building permits in the subdivision until DeStefano granted
the City a drainage easement. DeStefano replatted the subdivision for
single family residences and agreed to provide a drainage easement. The
Commission conditionally approved this third plat subject to final
31. Id. at 257-58, 403 S.E.2d at 653.
32. 290 S.C. 266, 349 S.E.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1986).
33. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing the Friarsgate
decision and the "majority view").
34. DeStefano sought the annexation into the City because of the tougher
drainage requirements of the County of Charleston. DeStefano, 304 S.C. at 251,403
S.E.2d at 649.
35. Id. at 251-52, 403 S.E.2d at 649-50.
36. Id. at 252-53, 403 S.E.2d at 650.
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verification of the new drainage calculations. DeStefano never recorded
this plat, but the City subsequently rezoned the property for single-family
residences.37
DeStefano brought suit against the City challenging the rezoning of
the property and the refusal to issue building permits.3" The trial court
ruled for the City on all issues.39 On appeal, DeStefano claimed that he
had a vested right in the original multifamily classification. 4° In
addition, DeStefano claimed that the City was estopped from refusing to
issue new building permits because he had relied on the City's erroneous
recordation of the second plat under the multifamily zoning classifica-
tion.4 1
The supreme court held that DeStefano did not acquire vested rights
in the multifamily zoning classification because "DeStefano suffered no
hardship from rezoning. "42 The court noted that DeStefano had
voluntarily changed the subdivision to single-family lots and that, because
he had made only preliminary improvements to the development, he
could sell the land to a variety of potential buyers.43
The court also rejected DeStefano's estoppel argument. The court
held that the City was not estopped from rezoning the property because
the Zoning Administrator and the Deputy City Engineer acted beyond the
scope of their governmental authority by allowing DeStefano to record
the revised plat.' As the court noted: "'No estoppel can grow out of
dealings with public officers of limited authority, and the doctrine of
37. Id. at 253, 403 S.E.2d at 650-51.
38. Id. at 253, 403 S.E.2d at 651.
39. d.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 257-58, 403 S.E.2d at 653. DeStefano also argued that the rezoning
of his property was arbitrary and capricious, but the court held that the City's
decision to rezone to single-family residential was a "fairly debatable" government
decision. Id. at 255-56, 403 S.E.2d at 652 (citing Rushing v. City of Greenville, 265
S.C. 285, 217 S.E.2d 797 (1975)). Finally, DeStefano claimed that the City's refusal
to issue additional building permits was a temporary taking. However, the court
dismissed this claim as without merit because DeStefano did not show that the City's
actions on the drainage problem were unwarranted. Id. at 253-55,403 S.E.2d at 652-
53.
42. Id. at 254, 403 S.E.2d at 652 (citing Friarsgate v. Town of Irmo, 290 S.C.
266, 349 S.E.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1986)).
43. Id. at 254-55, 403 S.E.2d at 651; see also F.B.R. Investors v. County of
Charleston, 303 S.C. 524, 402 S.E.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a developer
did not acquire vested rights in property that was rezoned prior to the second phase
of development because the developer had not obtained building permits and had done
little work on phase two in reliance on the original zoning classification).
44. DeStefano, 304 S.C. at 257, 403 S.E.2d at 653.
[Vol. 44
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equitable estoppel cannot ordinarily be invoked to defeat a municipality
in the prosecution of its public affairs because of an error or mistake of
.. one of its officers or agents.'"4"
Unfortunately for developers, DeStefano leaves unclear exactly what
a landowner must do to establish a nonconforming use and thereby
acquire vested rights in a zoning classification. For years South Carolina
subscribed to a variation of the minority rule that rights may vest despite
a municipality's failure to issue a building permit.46
In Pure Oil Division v. City of Columbia47 the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that property owners acquired vested rights in the
prior zoning classification before a permit was issued because the
landowners substantially altered their position in reliance on the original
zoning classification. The court concluded that there is "no sound,
reason to protect vested rights acquired after a permit is issued, and to
deny such protection to similar rights acquired under an ordinance as it
existed at the time a proper application for a permit is made." In both
instances, the property owner relies on the right to use his property in
45. Id. at 257-58, 403 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting Farrow v. City Council, 169 S.C.
373, 382, 168 S.E. 852, 855 (1933)). However, the court stressed that "'[a]
governmental body is not immune from the application of the doctrine of estoppel
where its officers or agents act within the proper scope of their authority.'" Id. at
258, 403 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting South Carolina Coastal Council v. Vogel, 292 S.C.
449, 453, 357 S.E.2d 187, 189 (Ct. App. 1987)); cf. Abbeville Arms v. City of
Abbeville, 273 S.C. 491, 257 S.E.2d 716 (1979) (holding that a municipality was
estopped from refusing to issue a building permit). See generally Grayson P. Hanes
& J. Randall Minchew, On Vested Rights to Land Use and Development, 46 WAsH.
& LEE L. REv. 373 (1989) (discussing the doctrine of zoning estoppel).
46. See, e.g., Pure Oil Div. v. City of Columbia, 254 S.C. 28, 173 S.E.2d 140
(1970); see discussion infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. See generally Lynn
Ackerman, Comrient, Searching for a Standard for Regulatory Takings Based on
Investment-Backed Expectations: A Survey of State Court Decisions in the Vested
Rights and Zoning Estoppel Areas, 36 EMORY L.J. 1219 (1987) (providing an
excellent overview of vested rights approaches in different jurisdictions); DANIEL R.
MANDELKER & ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND
DEVELOPMENT 434 (3d ed. 1990). Absent a countervailing public interest, under the
minority rule rights vest when a landowner files a building permit application that
adheres to then-existing zoning ordinances. The property owner is deemed to have
relied on the prior zoning classification, and the government is estopped from
denying the permit. Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388,
396 (Utah 1980). But cf. Hanes & Minchew, supra note 45, at 379 ("Vested rights
and estoppel law are so amorphous that attempts to delineate majority and minority
rules are practically useless.").
47. 254 S.C. 28, 173 S.E.2d 140 (1970).
48. Id. at 33-34, 173 S.E.2d at 142-43.
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accordance with zoning regulations applicable at the time of an applica-
tion for the permit.49
In its analysis, the DeStefano court ignored Pure Oil and based its
decision on Friarsgate, Inc. v. Town of Irno.5 .The Friarsgate court
applied what many commentators call the "majority rule," under which
the landowner acquires vested rights to the zoning classification if, "'in
reliance upon a permit validly issued, he has, in good faith, (1) made a
substantial change of position in relation to the land, (2) made substantial
expenditures, or (3) incurred substantial obligations.'""1 The court
determined that, because the developer failed to obtain permits for all
fourteen buildings at once, the developer was not obligated to build the
entire project; therefore he acquired no vested rights. 52
Ironically, both Friarsgate and DeStefano concluded that a develop-
er's cautious business attitude indicated that the developer was not
committed to completing the development under the original zoning
classification.53 Thus, developers are faced with a dilemma because
"there is no predictable point short of adjudication which separates
reliance that is less than 'substantial' from the reliance sufficient to result
in a vested right or to support an estoppel."s" Developers must either
construct projects rapidly, or assume the risk that a municipality might
downzone the property.
49. Id. at 34, 173 S.E.2d at 143.
50. 290 S.C. 266, 349 S.E.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1986). In Friarsgate a developer
purchased a tract of land in a municipality before the municipality had enacted any
zoning regulations. After the developer completed plans for a condominium project,
prepared the land, acquired building permits for five units (one building), and began
constructing the piers and foundation of the complex, the municipality enacted zoning
regulations that prohibited condominiums. Id. at 268, 349 S.E.2d at 892-93.
51. Id. at 269, 349 S.E.2d at 893 (emphasis added) (quoting 4 EDWARD H.
ZEIGLER, JR. ET AL., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 50.03[3]
(1986)).
52. Id. at 272, 349 S.E.2d at 895; see also Avco Community Developers, Inc.
v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976) (holding that, under the
majority rule, a developer's expenses of $2,082,070 and liabilities of $740,468 were
not sufficient to establish vested rights absent the issuance of building permits), cert.
denied 429 U.S. 1083 (1977).
53. See Friarsgate, 290 S.C. at 272, 349 S.E.2d at 895 (noting that Friarsgate's
"decision to build the entire project was contingent on the financial success of the
first five units. If, market response to the first units was poor, the project would not
be completed."); DeStefano, 304 S.C. at 255, 403 S.E.2d at 651 ("It appears that
DeStefano was responding to what the market would bear, as opposed to pursuing a
comprehensive development scheme.").
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South Carolina needs a more equitable and more predictable vested
rights rule. The Friarsgate approach, which requires both "substantial"
obligations or expenditures and the issuance of a permit, offers no
predictability for developers who must spend large sums of money on
projects before obtaining building permits. Developers' losses caused by
this unsettled law may ultimately stifle economic development and
increase housing costs. Nonetheless, local governments must retain
zoning powers to screen potential nuisances and environmental hazards.
Although the "majority rule" used in South Carolina fails to meet these
goals, approaches that allow rights to vest without the issuance of
building permits lack the predictability necessary to protect both the
public and private sectors."
One of many possible solutions to South Carolina's problematic
vested rights law is the development agreement. 6 A development
agreement is a contract between a municipality or county and a develop-
er, which allows a developer to "insulate a development project from a
change in regulations."' These agreements allow local governments and
residents to voice their concerns before the developer expends substantial
time and money on a development project.5 Several states have adopted
this approach in their attempts to solve the continuing problem of vested
rights.59 Given the current state of South Carolina vested rights law,
legislative involvement may be the best solution to this real estate
development problem.
Russell A. DeMott
55. See, e.g., Russell v. Guilford County, 397 S.E.2d 335 (N.C. 1990) (holding
that the issuance of a building permit is not the determinative factor because a
sufficient amount of reliance on the zoning classification is all that is necessary to
acquire vested rights in that classification)..The North Carolina standard is essentially
the same as South Carolina's under Pure Oil, discussed supra notes 47-49 and
accompanying text. Similarly, Georgia does not require that a permit be issued in
order for zoning rights to vest. See, e.g., City of Atlanta v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 246 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1978) (holding that a land owner has a vested right in
the zoning classification at the time the land owner applies for a permit).
56. See generally CHARLES L. SIEMON ET AL., VESTED RIGHTS: BALANCING
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS 48-88 (1982) (discussing
development agreements and other approaches to vested rights problems).
57. SIEMON ET AL., supra note 56, at 84.
58. See MANDELKER & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 46, at 437-38.
59. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 163.3225(1) (Harrison 1989) (providing for
"at least two public hearings").
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